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This paper focuses on how governments respond to cartel violence in Colombia and 
Mexico with either cooperation or retaliation. I tested three explanations in Medellin from 1984 
to 1993 and Culiacan from 2000 to 2011. While the theory suggests that state repression causes 
cartel violence or, the other way around, based on the empirical analysis, I find that the theories 
that focus only on cartel violence are insufficient because there is an interrelationship between 
international assistance, type of cartel violence, and the type of cartel territorial control with how 
governments respond to cartel violence. Therefore, I conclude that the type of cartel violence and 
the type of cartel territorial control have the most potent effect on how governments respond to 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
With the rise of violent cartels in Latin America and North America, drug cartel violence 
has been constant since the 1980s. Violence in the countries residing the most powerful cartels 
increased by reaching 27,213 homicides in 2011 in Mexico and 28,441 homicides in 1993 in 
Colombia. For instance, in 1984, the Medellin Cartel had an assassin shot and kill Justice 
Rodrigo Lara Bonilla in Bogota, Colombia (Perera 2015). The following year, Pablo Escobar had 
financed an attack with armed guerrillas at the Palace of Justice in Bogota, Colombia, that 
resulted in the death of over 100 people, including governmental officials. In 1989, a presidential 
candidate, Luis Carlos Galan Sarmiento, was shot and killed on stage in Soacha, Bogota. Then, 
later that year, the Avianca airplane was destroyed by an explosive device killing 113 people. 
The destruction of that plane was an attempt to kill Cesar Gaviria Trujillo, a political candidate. 
In 1991, the Medellin homicide rate reached its top-level of 381 deaths per 100,000 habitants, 
making it the most violent city in the world under Pablo Escobar's cartel (Durán-Martínez 2015). 
Initially, the Colombian government retaliated against the Medellin Cartel but then it later 
complied by paralyzing the extradition laws. However, that was not enough for the Medellin 
cartel, and violence continued to emerge in Colombia. After the assassination of a presidential 
candidate, the United States provided support to the Colombian government to eradicate the 
Medellin Cartel with the Andean Initiative.  
Similarly, the Mexican government was hit with constant violence from the most 
powerful cartels. Between 2006 and 2012, narco-executions killed 2,894 police forces and 262 
public officials (Rosen and Zepeda 2016). In November 2010, Mexican drug cartels executed the 






murdered a PRI candidate for the government of Tamaulipas, Rodolfo Garcia Cantu.  Drug 
cartels also managed to kill Jose Francisco Blake Mora, a Minister of the Interior, which was the 
federal government's second-highest position (Lerner 2011). Violent attacks against the Mexican 
government did not stop there, it still happens until this day. An estimated 150,000 deaths have 
occurred since 2007, and more will continue to pile up unless this violence is eradicated. 
Mexico's transition to democracy in the early 2000s gave fuel to the burning fire of violence. 
Mexican cartels felt obligated to use violence as the preferred method to influence the Mexican 
government to comply with their demands until Calderon's presidency officially declared war on 
drugs leading to a bilateral agreement between Mexico and the United States to combat narcotics 
through the Merida Initiative. 
This paper focuses on how governments respond to cartel violence in Colombia and 
Mexico with either cooperation or retaliation. I have tested the following explanations in 
Medellin and Culiacan. Firstly, when there is cartel monopoly control, governments are most 
likely to respond with cooperation. Secondly, when cartels use direct coercive violence against 
the state, governments are most likely to respond with retaliation against cartels. Lastly, when 
there is sufficient international assistance governments respond with retaliation against cartels 
because of adequate counternarcotic funds and resources in law enforcement. While the theory 
suggests that state repression causes cartel violence or, the other way around, based on the 
empirical analysis, I find that the theories that focus only on cartel violence are insufficient 
because there is an interrelationship between international assistance, type of cartel violence, and 
the type of cartel territorial control with how governments respond to cartel violence. Therefore, 
I conclude that the type of cartel violence and the type of cartel territorial control have the most 






I have structured this paper into five sections. In the first section of the paper, I will 
discuss state response and cartel violence literature. In the second section, I will discuss the 
possible explanations of government response to cartel violence. The third section introduces the 
methodology that I will conduct in my research to explore the interaction between international 
assistance, the type of cartel territorial control, and the type of cartel violence with governments 
response to cartel violence by either cooperating or retaliating. In the fourth part of my paper, I 
will examine the interaction between international assistance, the type of cartel territorial control, 
and the type of cartel violence with governments' response to cartel violence in Medellin and 
Culiacan. The last section of the paper will discuss the results of the interaction between 
international assistance, the type of cartel territorial control, and the type of cartel violence with 
the outcome of government response. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the main findings. 
 
1.1 Literature Review 
Why do drug cartels use violence against governments? To answer this question, we must 
look into the literature on drug cartel violence and state response. For instance, Lessing argued 
that turfs wars versus cartel cooperation caused whether the cartel used violent lobbying or 
violent corruption against Mexico and Colombia's governments (Lessing 2015). Additionally, he 
compared organized criminal groups to insurgencies, guerrillas, or terrorist groups. Turfs wars 
among cartels is an approach of contest like insurgencies, guerrillas, or terrorist groups that want 
to remove or replace the governments. Moreover, Lessing explains that drug cartels use the 
constraint approach, i.e., coercive force against governments unlike the conquest approach used 






Similarly, Duran-Martinez argues that the state security apparatus's cohesion and 
competition among cartels determine drug cartels' incentives to employ violence. Violence is 
visible and frequent when traffickers are competing with each other, and the government is 
fragmented. By contrast, violence is less visible and frequent when the cartel market is 
monopolized, and the state security apparatus is cohesive (Durán-Martínez 2015). Likewise, Rios 
argues when there is violence and competition among cartels, local elected officials are more 
likely to get attacked (Rios 2012). 
However, state repression scholars focus on how the state's response affects criminal 
group’s violence. Bailey and Taylor focus on governments' attempts to control or repress 
criminal groups triggers how criminal groups employ different tools and instruments in three 
categories: evasion, corruption, and confrontation against the government (Bailey and Taylor 
2009). Their argument consists of confrontational signals used as a calculation by criminal 
groups. It is most likely used when organized crime segments believe the costs of tolerating 
government actions are higher than the risks of drawing attention to themselves. Calderon et al. 
analyze whether the captures or assassination of kingpins and lieutenants have increased drug-
related violence and whether the violence overflows spatially. The evidence suggests that the 
capture or killings of drug cartels leaders have worsening effects on drug trafficking 
organizations related to violence and homicides that affect the general population. However, 
lieutenants' captures or killings seem only to make things worse with violence in "strategic 
places" or municipalities located in the transportation network. Most importantly, most of the 
drug trafficking-related violence effects are during the first six months after the drug kingpin's 






Another contribution to state repression literature is Philips's theoretical framework that 
suggests a distinction between political and criminal groups and uses it to explain how leadership 
removal affects criminal violence. Philips argues that groups differ in terms of incentives they 
offer recruits or members and the "market" they function in. For example, criminal groups 
depend on "material" incentives, and leaders coordinate those incentives. Therefore, leadership 
decapitation can disturb the illicit business in the short-term. However, long-term, as long as 
there is a demand in the market for criminal groups' services, any weak organization will be 
replaced. Violence will continue despite leadership removal and can increase due to it (Phillips 
2015).   
Lastly, the cartel structure literature contributes to the correlation between cartel structure 
and the policymaking process. Desmond-Arias examines how criminal organizations influence 
the policymaking process. He argues that three dynamic principles emerge based on the structure 
of the crime and the relationships these groups have with state officials. Then, this relationship 
shapes the experience of policymaking in locales where these criminal organization function. 
When armed actors have a strong relationship with the state officials, they are more influential in 
the policy process. On the other hand, if there is a competition between these criminal 
organizations and the state, then the criminal organizations can manipulate the policy process by 
semi-clandestine contacts with civic groups. However, when there is unorganized and little 
connection with criminal groups have little direct influence on policy process, but the criminal 
group’s presence and violent activities can create friction that increases the costs of enforcing a 
policy (Desmond-Arias, 2018). The cartel structure literature relates to the literatures of state 







The contributions above have helped expand the literature on cartel violence and state 
response. For instance, inter-cartel scholars argue that the type, frequency, and visibility of 
violence depends on conflicts between cartels. On the other hand, state repression scholars argue 
that state oppression against cartels can trigger drug cartel violence when the cost of tolerating 
government actions are low and there is leadership removal. Contrarily, the cartel structure 
scholars argue that criminal organizations can influence policymaking by the relationship 
criminal organizations have with state officials. Therefore, if there is less connection between 
criminal organizations and state officials, it can create violent activities from the criminal 
organization which increases the cost of enforcing policy. Unfortunately, the literature is 
insufficient because it’s missing the cycle interaction between possible explanations that cause 
governments to response to cartel violence. I would like to contribute to the literature of cartel 
violence and state response by focusing on the explanations of government response to cartel 
violence. 
 
1.2 Explanations to Government Response 
How do governments respond to drug cartel violence? The government, employing social 
contract, should protect its citizens no matter the cost, but that is not the case in Colombia and 
Mexico. Unfortunately, these governments are challenged by the violence caused by drug cartels. 
Additionally, they have weak state institutions that make it difficult to combat cartel violence. I 
explore three explanations that elucidate governments response to drug cartel violence. These 
explanations build upon the literature of cartel violence and state response because the literature I 
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Table 1 Possible Explanations of Government Response 
 
As you can see in Table 1, cartel monopoly control in a given territory has many 
advantages for the government to cooperate with them. For instance, the majority of the people 
in these territories are loyal to the cartels making it hard for police officials to find cartels' 
hotspots, or municipal security forces that are under cartels’ control can serve as informants or 
enforcers of the cartels (Trejo and Ley, 2021). However, when there is cartel competitive control 
with multiple cartels in a territory, cartels will protect their territory by all means necessary 
against competitors or law enforcements. Consequently, cartels begin to carry out acts of 
violence against their competitors or government officials. Rival cartels can use these acts of 
violence to collaborate with law enforcement to tackle down the violent cartel. Then, the 
government uses this opportunity to retaliate against the violent cartel. Therefore, I argue that 
cartel monopolization influences governments to respond with cooperation, and they respond 
with retaliation when there are multiple cartels in a given territory. 
Secondly, cartels use violence as a strategic purpose against governments when states 
interfere with their business and when governmental officials do not accept materialistic 






against the local populace, the security forces and government are used to intimidate anyone 
contemplating resistance to drug trafficking (Knowles, 2008). Government’s response depends 
on the type of violence used by cartels that causes retaliation. In other words, if cartels use 
coercive force against government officials, governments are most likely to retaliate against 
cartels. This government response is because the state’s primary objective with respect to public 
security is to maintain public order or to maintain the impression of it; therefore, when it is 
challenged by cartels it must respond with full force. Nevertheless, I argue that when cartels use 
violence against the state, governments are most likely to retaliate against cartels. 
Lastly, when international assistance is low or insufficient in a weak state, the state’s law 
enforcement faces significant challenges in making the federal police more efficient, effective, 
and accountable with the lack of funding, resources, inadequate training, and corruption (Reames 
2003). These challenges make it difficult for law enforcement to retaliate effectively against 
highly trained cartels and have all the resources for combat against the police. Nevertheless, 
when there is high or sufficient international assistance provided for these governments, they are 
given funds to retaliate against drug cartels. These assistance programs include monetary funds 
for a counternarcotic measure such as military assistance, the training and equipping counter-
narcotics battalions, technology, intelligence training, and institutional reform. Once these 
governments apply these counternarcotic measurements, retaliation is the best approach against 
drug cartels. On that account, I argue that international assistance might have a significant effect 
on the outcome of government response. Also, I would like to acknowledge that there is a 
possibility for inter-relationship among my independent variables that I will address in my case 







H1: When there is cartel monopoly control governments are most likely to respond with 
cooperation. 
 
H2: When cartels use direct coercive violence against the state governments are most likely to 
retaliate against cartels. 
 
H3: When there is sufficient international assistance governments respond with retaliation 




In this section of the paper, I introduce the methodology that I used to explore the interaction 
between type of cartel territorial control, the type of cartel violence, and international assistance 
with governments response to cartel violence. I intend to test these explanations by using 
Medellin and Culiacan as the unit of analysis. I conducted a case study using the most similar 
research design and qualitative comparative analysis using my independent variables, i.e., 
international assistance, type of cartel territorial control and the type of cartel violence and 























































































Table 2 Case Timeframes and Explanations of Government Responses 
 
I will conduct a longitudinal study in Medellin and Culiacan with two different 
timeframes in each city. Therefore, many of the confounding variables that might explain the 
outcomes of my dependent variable stay the same, except for my main variables of interests 
which are international assistance, the type of cartel territorial control, and the type of cartel 
violence. Medellin and Culiacan both have geographical location that gives advantage to the 






consumer the United States. These variables do not affect the outcome of my dependent variable 
because they remain constant across the cases, allowing me to examine the effects of variation in 
my independent variables, international assistance, type of cartel territorial control and type of 
cartel violence.  
Table 2 illustrates possible explanations to government response in Medellin and 
Culiacan; these explanations can explain if the government responds with cooperation or 
retaliation. For example, Medellin did not have sufficient international assistance in the late 
1980s; however, by the early 1990s, the Andean Strategy Plan was implemented in Colombia 
with sufficient funds to combat drug cartels. Not to mention, the Medellin cartel had significant 
control of its territory until the early 1990s. The type of cartel violence in the mid-1980s up to 
the 1990s was mostly cartel-state violence in Medellin. 
 In the same fashion, Culiacan did not receive sufficient international assistance before 
2007 until the Merida Initiative was implemented. Culiacan’s type of cartel territorial control 
changed in the early 2000s but then remained under the Sinaloa Cartels’ control. However, 
Culiacan’s type of cartel violence was mostly cartel-civilian violence and inter-cartel violence 
before 2007, but then it changed to cartel-state violence. The timeframes that I will observe are 
1984-1989 and 1990-1993 in Medellin and 2000- 2007 and 2008-2011 in Culiacan. These 
timeframes will help me process trace how my independent variables affect the dependent 
variables. The scope conditions are given that there is state weakness the above explanations can 
be generalize to other cases. Additionally, the hypotheses that I stated above can explore the 
possibility of alternative explanations and whether there is a relationship between the above 
variables that explain governments response. However, I must mention that there is a possibility 









I collected qualitative and quantitative data to measure my independent variables, i.e., 
international assistance, the type of cartel control and the type of cartel violence to examine how 
each independent variable interacts with my dependent variables' outcomes: cooperation or 




I define international assistance when assistance is provided from a foreign state in forms 
of military assistance, training and equipping counternarcotic battalions, technology and 
intelligence training and counternarcotic and economic monetary funds from the used towards 
military assistantship, training and equipping counternarcotic units, technology, and intelligence 
training by the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), International 
Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Economic 
Support Fund (ESF). I used INCLE, IMET, FMF, and ESF because they are the funding account 
names provided by USAID that funded counternarcotic initiatives. I measured international 
assistance given each year to the Colombian or Mexican government using U.S. Government 
Documents, USAID, and other sources with international assistance reports. High level of 
international assistance will be measure as greater than 82 million dollars used towards military 
assistantship, training and equipping counternarcotic units, technology, and intelligence training. 






million dollars whereas low level of international assistance will be measure as less than 24 
million dollars used towards military assistantship, training and equipping counternarcotic units, 
technology, and intelligence training. 
 
Type of Cartel Territorial Control 
 
I distinguish between two types of cartel territorial control: cartel monopoly control and 
cartel competitive control. Cartel monopoly control is when cartels have monopoly over a given 
territory by controlling sales of drugs, transit of drugs, aspects of the population and is able to 
protect its territory by all means necessary when threatened by a competitor or law enforcement 
officials. On the other hand, cartel competitive control is when there are two or more cartels or 
independent operators have control of a given territory. To measure the type of cartel territorial 
control, I used secondary sources such as newspaper reports coding for disputes within cartels.  
 
Type of Cartel Violence 
 
I distinguish between three types of cartel violence: cartel-civilian violence, cartel-state 
violence, and inter-cartel violence. Cartel-civilian violence is when cartels use coercive force 
against civilians in forms of extortion, kidnappings, assassinations, and bombings. In contrast, 
cartel-state violence is when cartels use coercive force against security forces and governments 
in forms of firefights, raids, assassinations, and bombings. On the other hand, inter-cartel 






assassinations, kidnappings, and bombings. I used the above indicators to locate that information 
in newspapers reports and violence related studies. 
 
Government Response: Cooperation and Retaliation 
 
I define cooperation when the municipal, state or federal government comply with cartels 
by protecting, facilitating, staying on standby when there is cartel-related violence, or not 
extraditing important leaders of the cartels when arrested. I measured cooperation using the 
above indicators by looking when cartel-related violence occurs in the forms of assassinations, 
kidnappings, and bombings occur; when the authorities fail to take any action to stop it and when 
cartel leaders are arrested but are not extradited. By contrast, I define retaliation as a mechanism 
of state repression against cartels in the forms of police/military operations such as 
raids/seizures, extraditions, or confrontations between police/military and cartels. Retaliation and 
cooperation were located with newspaper reports and articles. Cooperation was placed at one 













3 CASE STUDIES 
 
3.1 Medellin’s Government Response to Cartel Violence 
In this section, I will examine Medellin’s government response depending on the level of 
international assistance, cartel monopoly control, and type of cartel violence. The Colombian 
government began to receive U.S. antinarcotic assistance in 1973 when both states signed a 
bilateral agreement; since then, the U.S. had provided funds to the Colombia government in 
forms of aircraft, vehicles, communication, and investigative supplies and equipment to 
Colombian narcotics control and law enforcements (GAO, 1988). However, I will focus on the 
timeframe from 1984 to 1993 to see how my independent variables, type of cartel territorial 
control, international assistance, and the type of cartel violence, affect the Colombian 
government response to cartel violence with either cooperation or retaliation against cartels. The 
graphs below show U.S. funding assistance and extraditions from 1984 to 1993. 
 
 
Figure 1 U.S. Anti-narcotics assistance to the Colombian government from 1984 to 1993 
            Source: U.S. Foreign Aid Greenbook 
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         Figure 2 Extraditions from 1984 to 1993  
         Source: Extradition: between impunity and negotiated justice by Sebastian Zuleta 
 
In April of 1984, the Medellin cartel assassinated the Minister of Justice, Rodrigo Lara 
Bonilla, who was also known to openly criticized cartels and talked about his enforcement 
against drug trafficking (El Colombiano). After this attack from the Medellin Cartel, the 
Colombian government did not take it well. President Betancur retaliated against the cartel by 
enforcing extradition treaties that he initially did not want to implement in Colombia. During this 
year, the Medellin cartel had cartel monopoly control and the level of international assistance 
was low; that being the case, I argue that the cartel-state violence explanation is the best to 
explain the Colombian government response during this year. The Colombian government 
responded with retaliation towards the cartel because the cartel used direct coercive violence 
against the state. The violence used was against the Minister of Justice of Colombia, an 
important leader responsible for the law and justice for the national executive ministry of the 
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cartel can be explained by the Colombian government responding with force to maintain order or 
at least the impression of it.  
The following year, Bogota’s Superior Court Judge Tulio Manuel Castro Gil, who had 
indicted Escobar for the murder of Lara Bonilla is assassinated as he climbs into a taxi. 
Throughout 1985 judicial harassment and intimidation becomes commonplace in Colombia. 
Consequently, in November of 1985, the Medellin Cartel financed the M-19 guerilla to ambush 
the Supreme Court of Colombia resulting with the death of 100 people, including police officers 
and 12 judges of the Supreme Court of Colombia (Atta and Anderson, 1988). After the ambush 
in the Supreme Court, the Colombian government continued to retaliate with the extradition 
treaties of drug traffickers. As you can see in Figure 2, the Colombian government allowed for 
five Colombian citizens to be extradited to the United States. In this point in time, the level of 
international assistance was low, and the Medellin cartel continued to have monopolization over 
its territory. Henceforth, I argue that cartel-state violence continued to influence the Colombian 
government to respond with retaliation in the form of extraditions because the Medellin cartel 
carried out multiple assassinations of Supreme Court Judges and other important government 
officials. As I stated, when cartels used coercive violence against the state, governments respond 
with retaliation.          
In December of 1986, Guillermo Cano Isaza, the editor-in-chief of El Espectador, was 
assassinated on his way home from work (Forero, 2020). He was known to write about tough 
penalties against drug traffickers. In late August 1986, a few weeks after President Barco took 
office, a trial judge, apparently bribed or threatened by traffickers, unexpectedly cooperated with 
the release of cartel member Jorge Luis Ochoa. Ochoa had recently been extradited from Spain 






cooperated with releasing and not extraditing Jorge Luis Ochoa, one of the key founding 
members of the Medellin Cartel. In 1986, the Colombian government received 11.59 million 
dollars which is a low amount of international assistance. Additionally, the Medellin cartel 
continued to have monopoly control of Medellin. Violence in Medellin reached 115 homicides 
per 100,000 with cartel-civilian violence. Therefore, I argue that each of my independent 
variables can explain the Colombian government's response with cooperation during the above 
incidents. Meanwhile, I also consider that the change of Presidents from Bentacur to Barco did 
not impact the Colombian government's response since President Barco did not take any action 
against drug cartels once he took office. Therefore, international assistance, the type of cartel 
territorial control, and the type of cartel violence affected the Colombian government's response 
during this year. 
However, in June 1987, the Colombian Supreme Court, intimidated by all the violence 
and threats the Medellin Cartel expose the Colombian government, ruled the extradition treaty 
unconstitutional despite President Barco’s signature. Then, in November of 1987, Jorge Luis 
Ochoa was captured. Twenty-four hours after his capture, gang thugs arrive at the house of Juan 
Gomez Martinez, an editor of Medellin’s newspaper El Colombiano. They provide Gomez with 
a communique from “The Extraditables,” which threatens the Colombian government with 
executions of Colombian political leaders if Ochoa is extradited (PBS). Later that year, Ochoa 
was release under doubtful legal matters. As a result, the Colombian government cooperated 
with the cartel by releasing Ochoa and ruling out the extradition treaties. The Colombian 
government had received a low amount of international assistance of 12.92 million dollars. 
Moreover, the Medellin cartel continued to have monopoly control over its territory. As a 






and a low level of international assistance. The Medellin Cartel continued to show monopoly 
control of its territory by founding “The Extradibles” and controlling an aspect of the population 
by threatening to conduct coercive violence against the state by killing political leaders. In 
conjunction, the Colombian government did not have enough funds to overcome the corruption 
of the release of Ochoa’s doubtful legal matters.  
In January of 1988, the murder of Colombian Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos was 
claimed by the Extraditables (PBS). Hoyos was investigating wrongdoings in the government 
and judiciary. He also had recently begun to investigate Jorge Luis Ochoa Vasquez's release. 
President Barco promised not "give in" to blackmail or intimidation by traffickers in a national 
speech. He invoked the state of siege powers and announced a package of emergency measures, 
the Statute for the Defense of Democracy. Specifically, he announced that he would increase the 
National Police force of 70,000 men by 5,000 and appoint 5,000 new judges and assistants. 
Barco also pledged to renew extradition efforts and ordered the military to join the police in a 
new offensive. In a month, the army destroyed two large cocaine processing complexes and 
dozens of smaller ones but did not recapture Jorge Ochoa (Bagley, 1988). Although international 
assistance was low and the Medellin cartel had monopoly control, the Colombian government 
responded with retaliation instead of cooperation. Under those circumstances, I argue that the 
Colombian government responded with retaliation against the Medellin cartel because cartel-
state violence was used against the Colombian government by assassinating Colombia's General 
Attorney Hoyos. As a result, the Colombian government retaliates to maintain public order 
disturbed by the Medellin cartel. 
In 1989, the Medellin Cartel carried out several manifestations of violence against the 






a speech. Then, they killed Judge Maria Elena, who refused to take brides throughout her career. 
Later that year, they killed the presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan when he appeared to 
demonstrate his campaign. They later exploded a bomb on a commercial airplane to murder his 
replacement, killing all those aboard. The assassination of the presidential candidate of the New 
Liberalism party Luis Carlos Galán on August 18, 1989, and the "declaration of war" on August 
24 by the Extraditables against the Colombian government gave a sense of urgency to the US 
mobilization. On August 25, President Bush invoked Section 506 (a) of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961 and ordered 65 million dollars in military supplies to the Colombian Armed Forces 
and police (Guaqueta, 2005). President Bush seized the opportunity to launch the United States 
National Drug Control Strategy. He presented the Andean Strategy in his televised address on 
September 6, 1989. In addition, the Colombian government ordered to destroy all airplane 
landings strips that were not registered with the government. 
Additionally, the identities of Supreme Court judges that handle narcotic cases were kept 
secret. By the end of that year, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez, one of the drug lords of the Medellin 
cartel, was killed by the Colombian police in a raid on his ranch in Tolu. As you can see in 
Figure 2, President Barco used his executive orders to bring extraditions into effect. As a result, 
the Colombian government extradited 15 Colombians to the United States. During this time, the 
Colombian government was not affected by the Medellin cartel monopoly control since it 
responded with retaliation. On the ground of this, I argue that the Colombian government 
retaliated against the cartel because the Medellin cartel used direct coercive violence against a 
presidential candidate and other government officials. On top of that, the United States gave a 







In April 1990, Pablo Escobar offered 4,200 dollars for each dead CNP police officer; 
thus, local killers responded by murdering 42 city police officers in May (De la Torre, 2008). On 
April 11, 1990, eight members of the Elite Corps died after the explosion of 100 kilos of 
explosives under the Pandequeso bridge. Unfortunately, eight civilians also lost their lives (El 
Colombiano). Meanwhile, the Andean Initiative was being implemented in Colombia. The 
Colombian government was provided economic, military assistance, and law enforcement 
assistance through INCLE, FMF, IMET, and MAP by receiving 111.07 million dollars. In the 
first five months of 1990, thirty-eight metric tons of cocaine were seized-surpassing the total for 
all of 1989. The cost of the offensive is estimated at 1 billion dollars (Committee on Government 
Operations, 1990).  After such violent events from the Medellin cartel, the Colombian 
government responded with retaliation because the Medellin cartel was using coercive violence 
against the state by offering 4,200 dollars for each dead CNP police officer, causing the death of 
42. Additionally, the international assistance from the United States helped the Colombian 
government respond with retaliation by extraditing three Colombians to the United States. 
However, when President Gaviria took office in late 1990, one of the Ochoa brothers 
surrendered when the Colombian government under Gaviria promised not to extradite him to the 
United States, where he was wanted for drug charges. Later that year, Ochoa's younger brother 
Fabio, also another cartel leader, surrendered. As you can see above in the extradition Figure, 
seven Colombians were extradited to the United States earlier that year. However, drug leaders 
like the Ochoa brothers were not extradited after President Gaviria took office. The following 
year, the new constitution declared an anonymous vote to ban extraditing criminals to the United 
States. As a result, Escobar, the Medellin Cartel drug lord, surrendered himself to the Colombian 






extradited under President Gaviria's Sometimiendo policy which demanded confession of crimes 
and for criminals to surrender. 
Meanwhile, the homicide rate was the highest point in Medellin, with 381 homicides per 
100,000 in 1991, including in the past thirteen months, about 350 policemen have been kill by 
hired sicarios (Farah, 1991). The Colombian government agreed to Escobar's surrender allowing 
him to live in La Catedral, which was known to be a luxurious mansion. I argue that the 
Colombian government cooperated by not extraditing these critical members of the Medellin 
cartel because President Gaviria's goal when he came into office was to reduce cartel violence. 
To that end, Gaviria's administration was more lenient with drug cartels and cooperated to stop 
cartel-civil violence and for the key members to surrender. As a result, the Medellin key 
members agreed to their surrender but under their conditions. At the same time, the Medellin 
cartel continued to have monopoly control over its territory, which I argue that it also contributed 
to the Colombian government cooperating with the Medellin cartel with its lenient prosecution 
laws.  
After Escobar's surrender, homicide rates went down fifteen percent; however, it all 
changed when Escobar brought two of his lieutenants, Fernando Galeano and Gerardo Moncada, 
to La Catedral for questioning. He suspected they were stealing from him; then, he killed them. 
After this event, Gavira ordered Escobar to be transferred to a more secure prison. As a result, 
Escobar escaped from La Catedral, Escobar's escaped humiliated the Colombian government. 
Unfortunately, the violence reemerged in Medellin. The Medellin cartel continued to kill police 
forces and launched bombs. For instance, a police officer was on his way home from work and 
was shot to death (UPI, 1992). The day before, five police officers were shot dead by young men 






Girardot sports stadium, killing fourteen people, including ten police officers among the dead 
(Reuters, 1992). The Medellin cartel also began to avenge military cartel boss Brances Munoz 
who died in a shootout with security forces. After Escobar escaped and there was continuous 
violence, under U.S. and Colombian police chiefs’ pressure, Gavira committed full force 
retaliation against the Medellin cartel. The Bloque de Busqueda among the DEA agency 
dedicated their intelligence to finding Escobar that eventually helped to find and killed Escobar 
in a shootout in December 1993. The Colombian government did have help with Escobar’s 
removal from the Cali cartel and Los PEPES. I argue that the Colombian government's 
retaliation response was caused by Escobar using violence while he was in La Cathedral because 
Escobar knew he was losing control of the Medellin cartel's monopoly control. Eventually, Los 
PEPES (People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar) ambushed the Medellin cartel with the help of the 
Cali cartel and collaborated with the Colombian authorities against the Medellin cartel, making it 
to a more competitive control. After Escobar's escape, he continued to use cartel-state violence 
by killing police officers and kidnapping government officials to negotiate with the Colombian 
government. However, the Colombian government ignored Escobar's request and continued to 
retaliate. Additionally, the international assistance given to the Colombian law enforcement by 
the creation of the Bloque de Busqueda and the assistance given by the DEA gave the Colombian 
government a better fighting chance against the Medellin cartel resulting in the death of Pablo 
Escobar. 
The Colombian government shifted from retaliation to cooperation or vice versa from 
1984 to 1993 when there was cartel violence. From 1984 to 1985, the Colombian government 
retaliated against the Medellin cartel since cartels used cartel-state violence against important 






more violence from the Medellin cartel. However, from 1986 to 1987, the Colombian 
government cooperated with the cartel by releasing and not extraditing Ochoa, and the Supreme 
Court declaring the extradition treaty unconstitutional. International assistance during these years 
was low, and the Medellin cartel had monopoly control over the sales of drugs, transit of drugs, 
and controlled aspect of the population with corruption. I argue that the most influential variables 
are international assistance for not having sufficient funds to overcome the corruption caused by 
the Medellin cartel's monopoly control that bribes government officials. 
Despite all, from 1988 to 1989, the Colombian government retaliated against the 
Medellin cartel because of several assassinations of government officials, making cartel-state 
violence and international assistance the important variables during this period by shifting the 
government response from cooperation to retaliation; meanwhile, cartel monopoly control stayed 
the same. From 1990 to 1992, the Colombian government response shifted from retaliation to 
cooperation. The Medellin cartel continued to enforce cartel violence even after President 
Gaviria took office. However, Gaviria decided to cooperate with the Medellin cartel with lenient 
prosecution laws against the cartel members if confessed and surrendered. I argue that Gaviria's 
administration impacted the Colombian government's response to cartel violence, and the shift 
from cartel monopoly control to a competitive control began when Escobar got "arrested" in 
1991. However, after Escobar escaped, the Colombian government decided not to tolerate the 
Medellin cartel's coercive violence against the state and ignored Escobar's attempts to negotiate. 
Instead, Gaviria's government committed itself to total retaliation against the Medellin cartel 
with the help of international assistance from the United States, which resulted with the Medellin 







3.2 Culiacan’s Government Response to Cartel Violence 
 
 
Figure 3 U.S. Anti-Narcotic Assistance to the Mexican government from 2000 to 2007 and 
Merida Initiative funding estimate FY2008 to FY 2011 
Source: U.S. Foreign Aid Greenbook; U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
budget office, U.S. Department of State 
 
 
Figure 4 Extraditions from 2000 to 2011 
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 In this section of the paper, I analyze Culiacan with the timeframes of 2000 to 2011. I want 
to see if there is a possible explanation of the Mexican government’s response to cartel violence 
by looking at international assistance, the type of cartel territorial control, and the type of cartel 
violence. As you can see in Figure 3, the Mexican government received 23.360 million dollars 
from the United States to support antinarcotic control in 2000. Then, the following year, the 
Mexican government received 49.685 million dollars, but it received the highest amount of U.S 
anti-narcotic assistance in 2006 with 166.825 million dollars (USAID). 
 Since 2000, the funds were used for equipment and training for the Mexican army, mainly 
to help the Mexican Navy intercept planes and vessels suspected of transporting illicit drugs. 
However, defense officials said that U.S. efforts to intercept suspected Mexican-flagged vessels 
are hampered by the lack of a maritime cooperation agreement and, also, that coordination with 
the Mexican Army, which manually eradicates drug crops (GAO, 2007). Narcotics Affairs 
Section (NAS) funded the maintenance of the aircraft and sensors and training for sensor 
operators and image analysts. Part of NAS funding was also used to provide logistical support to 
contractors, including spare parts. 
 In the early 2000s, Culiacan did not experience significant cartel-related violence but 
mostly turf wars between cartels. However, "El Chapo" Guzman escaped from prison in 2001 
with the helped of bribed guards. He was able to take monopoly control of his territory from 
Carrillo Fuentes and Arellano Felix in the mid-2000s (Mira and Curtis, 2003). I argue that the 
Mexican government cooperated with the Sinaloa cartel by facilitating El Chapo escaping from 
prison and not extraditing him while he was in prison; additionally, by not taking any action after 
his escape. During this period, the Mexican government received insufficient international 






the Sinaloa cartel. Moreover, the monopolization of the Sinaloa cartel over Culiacan and its 
surroundings controlled the local police making them loyal to the cartel by facilitating "El 
Chapo" Guzman's escape and his recapture with bribes. During this time, the type of violence 
was inter-cartel violence because there were disputes between factions of the Sinaloa cartel. As a 
result, these disputes among cartels did not get the Mexican government's attention to stop it by 
any means. 
 Visible violence during this cartel war was uncommon, and the Sinaloa cartel was careful 
to keep their confrontations under the radar (Duran-Martinez, 2018). In 2002, Ramon Arellano 
Felix was killed by the Sinaloa Cartel's gunmen and Sinaloa state police (Jordan and Sullivan, 
2002).  In another shoot-out between sicarios and Rodolfo Arellano Felixs' bodyguards in 2004, 
one of Rodolfo's bodyguards was injured. The bodyguard turned out to be the ministerial police 
of State (PME) Pedro Perez Lopez. During his recovery, the governor of Sinaloa gave him paid 
leave and praised him as an "effective commander." (Al Cimino, 2013). During this period, 
cooperation between municipal and federal police with cartels was common. I argue that 
cooperation from the municipal and federal police can be explained by the Sinaloa cartel offering 
better-paid protection since their salary is meager when there is not enough international 
assistance given to the Mexican government. Furthermore, it provides significant proof that the 
Sinaloa cartel began to monopolize its territory; meanwhile, inter-cartel violence occurred, and 
the state did not take any action to terminate it. 
 Despite that drug-related violence was not a big concern for the Mexican authorities before 
2006, the Mexican authorities under Fox’s administration still began to crack down on drug 
trafficking because of massive cooperation from lower parts of the Mexican government with 






extraditions to the United States. As you can see in Figure 4, extraditions increased from 2000 to 
2006. However, in September of 2001, Arturo Guzman Loera, brother of “El Chapo” Guzman, 
was arrested but later was killed in 2004 by another prisoner named Jose Ramirez Villanueva 
(Vanguardia). Then, in 2005, Miguel Angel Guzman Loera was detained by special forces of the 
Mexican Army in Culiacan, Sinaloa (Rosen and Zepeda, 2016). Although the Mexican 
government was extraditing drug traffickers to the United States, the Mexican government 
cooperated by not extraditing these important leaders once they were captured. The Mexican 
government continued not to receive a sufficient amount of international assistance. 
Furthermore, the Sinaloa cartel had a monopoly over its territory, making it easier to protect 
important leaders. 
 After President Calderon took office, he declared war on drugs. Just ten days after taking 
office, President Calderón deployed 6,784 soldiers, 1,054 Marines, 1,420 federal police officers, 
and 50 detectives in Michoacán (Grayson, 2010). President Calderón declared “a war on drugs” 
that continued during his administration and spread from Michoacán to at least seven other states 
and regions: Chihuahua, the Isthmus region (southern border of Mexico), Guerrero, Baja 
California, Sinaloa, Nuevo León-Tamaulipas, and the Golden Triangle (parts of Chihuahua, 
Sinaloa, and Durango). As a result, violence began to emerge at different levels in other states 
and cities have not experienced before; however, that was not the case for Culiacan. Culiacan 
reached its highest rate of 18.48 per 100,000 homicides in 2001, but it remained lower than 18.48 
per 1000,000 homicides between 2000 to 2007 (SNSP).  
 After a year of Felipe Calderon being in office, the Merida Initiative was signed between 
Felipe Calderon and George W. Bush in December of 2007. The initiative led to an increase in 






help train police officers, improvements in the security institutions that combat narcotics, and 
renovate the judiciary system in Mexico (Rosen and Zepeda, 2016). However, the Merida 
Initiative would not start until 2008. The U.S. provided 1.6 billion dollars to all the programs and 
activities under the Merida Initiative. I argue that the United States provided support to the 
Mexican government when Calderon took office since he declared war on drugs. The United 
States saw the opportunity to collaborate with the Mexican authorities. 
 Calderon’s crackdown causes kingpins like “El Chapo” and Ismael to lose billions of 
dollars and to make them fight over their plaza payments. As a result, Joaquin Guzman and 
Ismael Zambada fought in Culiacan, Sinaloa, against their longtime friend and ally “the Beard” 
Beltran Leyva. The turf war in Culiacan began in 2008, with cartel-related violence skyrocketing 
with 1,084 homicides. At the time of the turf war, El Chapo Guzman had an alliance with federal 
officials to take over all of Mexico’s trafficking supported by federal troops. Not to mention, El 
Chapo is known to have helped with the arrest of his enemies, for example, the brother of 
Alfredo Beltran Leyva, who was arrested in January of 2008 in Culiacan. The Mexican 
government’s “Operation Clean House,” i.e., an operation to find corruption among government 
officials, helped discover several federal police officials cooperating with the Sinaloa Cartel. 
President Felipe Calderon acknowledged that corruption among federal police and soldiers was a 
significant problem in Mexico, along with drug trafficking (Associated Press, 2008). The 
Mexican government retaliated against Levya’s (ABL cartel) faction; however, the Mexican 
government, with the help of international assistance, discovered that federal officials were 
cooperating with the Sinaloa cartel. 
 As shown in Figure 3, under the Merida Initiative, the Mexican government received 400 






provided by the U.S. anti-narcotic assistance, conducted several operations against cartels. On 
April 30th, 2008, a battle emerged in an upper-class neighborhood in Culiacan between state 
police and sicarios. Soon after the battle, two members of the state judicial police were declared 
dead. As a response, the Mexican federal government implemented the joint military-police 
Operation Culiacan-Navolato in response to these violent incidents in Culiacan. This operation 
mobilized 2,723 armed personnel, including soldiers, federal police, marines, and the attorney's 
general police (Duran-Martinez, 2015). By the end of May, this mobilization caused a major 
violent event in Culiacan between the federal police and sicarios. The federal police were 
preparing to search a house when the shooting broke out, in which a suspected hitman was killed 
and two were arrested (Expansion, 2008). I classify this action as retaliation by the Mexican 
government because they sent out the military to Culiacan once these violent events arose. The 
Mexican government had received a sufficient amount of international assistance from the 
United States, and there was cartel-state violence while these violent events took place. 
Additionally, I must also consider that the change in administration from Fox to Calderon 
impacted the Mexican government's response with retaliation. Therefore, Calderon's repression 
against drug cartels affected cartel violence throughout Mexico, making this an ongoing cycle. 
In 2009, the Mexican government received 460 million dollars from the FMF, ESF, and 
INCLE. The following year, Mexico received 639 million dollars which was the highest amount 
received from the U.S. However, in 2011, it began to decrease, with the Mexican government 
receiving 143 million dollars from FMF, ESF, and the INCLE. In 2009, the son of Ismael 
Zambada, Vicente Zambada Niebla is captured by the Mexican Military, then he was extradited 
to the United States in 2010 (El Universal, 2009). Then, in December of 2009, Marcos Arturo 






intended to capture him; he was known to be one of the most violent members of the 
organization (U.S. Department of State). A year later, Carlos Beltran Leyva, Arturor’s brother 
was arrested in Culiacan by the Federal Police (El Universal, 2010). When the violence peaked 
in 2009 with 1059 and 2010 with 1815, the least disturbed organization appeared to be the 
Sinaloa Cartel, whose foremost leaders Guzmán and Zambada remained large and still in charge. 
The apparent triumph of the Sinaloa’s gave rise to speculation that this organization was better 
protected than its rivals by corrupting government authorities (Burnett, Menaloza and Benincasa 
2010). I argue that the Sinaloa cartel had disputes within its faction, forcing important cartel 
members to create their own organizations and declare war on the Sinaloa cartel, resulting in the 
Sinaloa cartel losing cartel monopoly control from 2000 to 2004 and after Calderon took office 
in 2008. However, after enough international assistance given by the United States, the Mexican 
government retaliated by extraditing 107 drug traffickers, assassinating, and capturing significant 
ABL cartel and Sinaloa cartel leaders. Additionally, cartel-state violence used by the cartel was 
against the Mexican government’s military, making the Mexican government retaliate even more 
against the cartels. Nevertheless, the Sinaloa cartel under Guzman and Zambada continued to 
have monopoly control once the critical leaders of the ABL cartel were removed even though the 
Mexican government retaliated more intensely towards the cartel than during Calderon’s 
presidency than Fox’s. 
 
4 DISCUSSION AND RESULTS: MEDELLIN AND CULIACAN 
 
In this section of the paper, I will discuss the results of the case study of Medellin and 






and Culiacan. I will explore the possibilities of international assistance, type of cartel territorial 
control, and type of cartel violence to have an interactive and cyclical nature with either 
cooperation or retaliation. At the end of this section, I will compare Medellin and Culiacan by 
applying the above variables and pointing out their interactions. 
 
Type of Cartel Territorial Control and Government Response 
 
In this part of the paper, I will apply hypothesis 1 to my cases: Medellin and Culiacan. 
My first hypothesis states that when there is cartel monopoly control, governments respond with 
cooperation. I will trace the interaction between the type of cartel territorial control and 
governments' response to cartel violence with either cooperation or retaliation. 
To begin with, the Medellin cartel had significant monopoly control from the late 1970s 
until the early 1990s. In the timeframes that I observed from 1984 to 1991, the Medellin cartel 
held monopolization until Escobar's arrest in 1991. In 1984, the Medellin cartel assassinated the 
Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla; thus, the Colombian government retaliated against the 
Medellin cartel by implementing extradition treaties with the United States even though the 
Medellin cartel had monopoly control. The following year, the Medellin cartel continued to carry 
out acts of violence, such as the assassination of a Superior Court Judge. The Colombian 
responded with retaliation by extraditing five Colombians to the United States; meanwhile, the 
Medellin continued to have monopoly control. In 1988, the Medellin cartel via the Extradibles 
assassinated Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos. Subsequently, the Colombian government 
responded with retaliation by destroying two large cocaine processing complexes and a dozen 






the Colombian government by assassinating Governor Antonio Roldan Bentacur, Judge Maria 
Elena, presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan, then later exploded a bomb on a commercial 
airplane to murder his replacement, killing all those aboard. The Colombian government 
responded with massive retaliation by destroying all airplane landings that were not registered 
with the government and brought extraditions into effect; going on, the Medellin cartel still had 
monopoly control. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was not accurate when the Medellin cartel monopoly 
control from 1984 to 1985 and 1988 to 1989. 
In 1986, the Medellin cartel assassinated Guillermo Cano (the editor-in-chief of El 
Espectador); instead of the Colombian government retaliating against the Medellin cartel, it 
cooperated to cartel violence by releasing and not extraditing Jorge Luis Ochoa, one of the key 
founding members of the Medellin Cartel when the Medellin cartel held cartel monopoly control. 
The following year of 1987, the Colombian government cooperated again by ruling the 
extradition treaty unconstitutional despite President Barco's signature and releasing Ochoa after 
his recapture in November that year; meanwhile, the Medellin held cartel monopoly control. In 
1990, Pablo Escobar offered incentives for local killers to murder police officers resulting in the 
death of 42 police officers in one month. However, later that year, when Gaviria took office, he 
cooperated with the Ochoa brothers by negotiating their surrender without extraditions. The 
Medellin cartel continued to have monopoly control while these negotiations occurred. From 
1991 to 1993, the Medellin cartel began to lose monopoly control after Escobar "surrendered" to 
La Cathedral, which inclined the Colombian government to retaliate against the Medellin cartel 
once it began to have a more competitive control by collaborating with the DEA and unifying the 






accuracy when the Medellin cartel monopoly controlled from 1986 to 1987 and 1990 to 1991 
and began to lose monopoly control to a more competitive control from 1992 to 1993. 
On the other hand, the Sinaloa cartel did not have monopoly control before the mid-
2000s. In the early 2000s, Culiacan did not experience significant cartel-related violence but 
mostly turf wars between cartels. However, the Mexican government cooperated by facilitating 
El Chapo escaping from prison and not extraditing him while he was in prison; additionally, it 
did not take any action against the cartel after his escape. Additionally, during turf wars between 
Arellano Felix and the Sinaloa cartel, the Sinaloa state, and ministerial police cooperated with 
the Sinaloa cartel by protecting them against the Arellano Felix organization. On this account, 
hypothesis 1 was inaccurate when Culiacan had competitive cartel control from 2000 to 2004. 
 In the mid-2000s, “El Chapo” Guzman was able to take monopoly control from Carrillo 
Fuentes and Arellano Felix organizations. By the same token, after the capture of Miguel Angel 
Guzman Loera, an influential Sinaloa cartel leader in Culiacan, the Mexican government 
cooperated by not extraditing this important leader once he was captured. In 2008, the Sinaloa 
cartel began to lose monopoly control to a more competitive control when Calderon's crackdown 
caused "El Chapo" and Ismael to lose billions of dollars and to make them fight over their plaza 
payments. As a result, Joaquin Guzman and Ismael Zambada fought in Culiacan, Sinaloa, against 
their longtime friend and ally "the Beard" Beltran Leyva. The turf war in Culiacan began in 
2008, with cartel-related violence skyrocketing with 1,084 homicides. The Mexican 
government's "Operation Clean House," i.e., an operation to find corruption among government 
officials, helped discover several federal police officials cooperating with the Sinaloa Cartel. The 
Mexican government retaliated against Levya's (ABL cartel) faction by mobilizing armed 






Martinez, 2015). By the end of May, this mobilization caused a major violent event in Culiacan 
between the federal police and sicarios. The federal police were preparing to search a house 
when the shooting broke out, in which a suspected hitman was also killed, with two more were 
arrested. After the defeat of the ABL cartel in 2009, the Sinaloa cartel held monopoly control 
once again; thus, the Mexican government cooperated to cartel violence by failing to take any 
action to stop it. Nevertheless, hypothesis 1 was accurate when the Sinaloa cartel held monopoly 
control from 2005 to 2007 and 2009 to 2011, and when there was competitive cartel control, 
hypothesis 1 was accurate in 2008. As a result, after looking at each case, my overall assessment 
of the accuracy on hypothesis 1 is that it was accurate in Medellin and Culiacan. 
 
Type of Cartel Violence and Government Response 
 
In this part of the paper, I will apply hypothesis 2 to my cases: Medellin and Culiacan. 
My second hypothesis states that when cartels use direct coercive violence against the state, 
governments are most likely to respond with retaliation against cartels. I will use the same 
approach as above by tracing the interaction between the type of cartel violence and government 
response with either cooperation or retaliation. 
Violence in Medellin arose from the early 1980s to the early 1990s. After the 
assassination of Minister Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla by the Medellin cartel in 1984, the 
Colombian government responded with retaliation by enforcing extradition treaties. I argue that 
the cartel-state violence explanation clarifies the Colombian government's response during this 
year. The Colombian government responded with retaliation towards the cartel because the cartel 






Justice of Colombia, an important leader responsible for the law and justice for the national 
executive ministry of the government of Colombia. The following two years, the Medellin cartel 
continued to carry out cartel-state violence with the assassination of government officials and 
judges. 
Consequently, the Colombian government continued to retaliate with the extradition 
treaties of drug traffickers. From 1988 to 1989, there were multiple assassinations of an 
important political leader, a governor, an attorney general, and a judge by the Medellin cartel; 
because of that, the Colombian government retaliated against the cartel because the Medellin 
cartel used direct coercive violence against a presidential candidate and other government 
officials. From 1992 to 1993, after Escobar escaped, the Medellin cartel carried out multiple 
forms of coercive violence against the Colombian government by killing police officers and 
kidnapping government officials to negotiate with the Colombian government. However, the 
Colombian government did not tolerate the Medellin cartel violence and decided to retaliate 
against the Medellin cartel with the United States' help using the DEA and the Busque de 
Busqueda. Therefore, hypothesis 2 was accurate when cartel-state violence, i.e., direct coercive 
violence against the state from 1984 to 1989 and 1992 to 1993. 
In 1990, Pablo Escobar offered incentives for local killers to murder police officers 
resulting in the death of 42 police officers in one month. The Colombian government responded 
with cooperation when President Gavira introduced "lenient" prosecution laws against cartels. 
Therefore, the Colombian government cooperated by negotiating with the Ocha brothers when 
there was cartel-state violence. In 1991, the homicide rate was the highest point in Medellin, with 
381 homicides per 100,000, including in the past thirteen months, about 350 policemen have 






cooperated by agreeing to Escobar's surrender and allowing him to live in La Catedral, which 
was known to be a luxurious mansion. On the ground of this, hypothesis 2 was inaccurate when 
there is cartel-civil violence and cartel-state violence from 1990 to 1991.  
Violence in Culiacan was at low rates between 2000 to 2007; however, the homicide 
rates increased between 2008 to 2011. The Mexican government responded with cooperation 
when there was inter-cartel violence and cartel-civil violence. In the early 2000s, Culiacan did 
not experience significant cartel-related violence but mostly turf wars between cartels. However, 
"El Chapo" Guzman escaped from prison in 2001 with the helped of bribed guards. Therefore, 
the Mexican government cooperated with the Sinaloa cartel by facilitating El Chapo escaping 
from prison and not extraditing him while he was in prison; additionally, not taking any action 
after his escape. 
On the other hand, it responded with retaliation when there was cartel-state violence. For 
instance, On April 30th, 2008, a battle emerged in an upper-class neighborhood in Culiacan 
between state police and sicarios. Soon after the battle, two members of the state judicial police 
were declared dead. As a response, the Mexican federal government implemented the joint 
military-police Operation Culiacan-Navolato in response to several violent incidents in Culiacan. 
This operation mobilized armed personnel, including soldiers, federal police, marines, and the 
attorney's general police. By the end of May, this mobilization caused a major violent event in 
Culiacan between the federal police and sicarios. The federal police were preparing to search a 
house when the shooting broke out, in which a suspected hitman was also killed, with two more 
were arrested. Correspondingly, the Mexican government retaliated because they sent out the 
military to Culiacan once these violent events arose when there was cartel-state violence. 






violence between 2000 to 2011. Therefore, my overall assessment of the accuracy of hypothesis 
2 after analyzing each case is that it was accurate in Culiacan and Medellin. 
 
International Assistance and Government Response 
 
In this part of the paper, I applied hypothesis 3 to my cases: Medellin and Culiacan. My 
third hypothesis states that when there is sufficient international assistance, governments respond 
with retaliation against cartels because of adequate counternarcotic funds and resources in law 
enforcement. I will apply hypothesis 3 to Medellin first and then Culiacan. I process traced the 
interaction between international assistance and government response with either cooperation or 
retaliation. 
Medellin did not have sufficient international assistance in the late 1980s; however, by 
the early 1990s, the Andean Strategy Plan was implemented in Colombia to combat drug cartels. 
From 1984-85, the Medellin cartel had cartel violence against the state, such as assassinations of 
important government officials. Consequently, the Colombian government retaliated by 
enforcing extradition treaties with the United States; not to mention, the Colombian government 
received around 40 million dollars during these two years. From 1988-89, the Medellin Cartel 
carried out several manifestations of violence against the government. Firstly, the murder of 
Colombian Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos was claimed by the Extraditables. Afterward, 
the Medellin Cartel killed Governor Antonio Roldan Bentacur on his way to a speech. Then, they 
killed Judge Maria Elena, who refused to take brides throughout her career. Later in 1989, they 
killed the presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan when he demonstrated his campaign. They 






aboard. Henceforth, the Colombian government responded with retaliation by renewing 
extradition efforts and collaborating with the United States by implementing the Andean Strategy 
Plan and receiving over 70 million dollars within those two years. From 1992 to 1993, cartel 
violence reemerged by bombs being blasted, kidnappings of government officials, and police 
assassinations. Taking that into account, the Colombian government retaliated against the 
Medellin cartel with the international assistance given to the Colombian law enforcement by the 
creation of the Bloque de Busqueda, and the assistance given by the DEA gave the Colombian 
government a better fighting chance against the Medellin cartel resulting in the death of Pablo 
Escobar. Consequently, hypothesis 3 is accurate from 1984-85 with an overall medium level of 
international assistance and 1988-89 and 1992-93 with an overall high level of international 
assistance resulting in the Colombian government retaliating during those periods. 
After the Medellin cartel assassinated Guillermo Cano Isaza, the editor-in-chief of El 
Espectador, the Colombian government cooperated by not taking any action against the cartel. 
Additionally, the following year, Jorge Luis Ochoa, one of the key founding members of the 
Medellin Cartel, had recently been extradited from Spain to Colombia, and the United States 
wanted him extradited. The Colombian government cooperated with releasing and not 
extraditing Jorge Luis Ochoa. From 1986 to 1987, the Colombian government received a low 
amount of international assistance. In 1990-91, the Medellin cartel provided monetary incentives 
to local killers resulting in the death of many police officers; additionally, after receiving a 
medium level of international assistance, the Colombian government should have retaliated 
against the cartel. However, the Colombian government cooperated when President Gaviria 
began implementing his "lenient" prosecution laws under the Sometimiendo policy, eventually 






the United States. Hypothesis 3 was not accurate from 1986-87 with a low level of international 
assistance and 1990-1991 with a medium level of international assistance resulting in the 
Colombian government to respond with cooperation instead of retaliation. 
Culiacan did not receive sufficient international assistance before 2007 until the Merida 
Initiative was implemented. After a shooting broke out between the federal police and sicarios, 
two state judicial police were declared dead; thus, the Mexican federal government implemented 
the joint military-police Operation Culiacan-Navolato in response. Fortunately, the Mexican 
government had received a high level of international assistance from 2008 to 2009, which help 
with the mobilization of 2,723 armed personnel, including soldiers, federal police, marines, and 
the attorney's general police. This mobilization contributed to the capture and assassination of 
cartel members of the ABL cartel. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is accurate in 2008-11 with the 
Mexican government's overall high level of international assistance responding with retaliation 
during those periods. 
In the early 2000s, the Mexican government cooperated with the Sinaloa cartel by 
facilitating El Chapo escaping from prison and not extraditing him while he was in prison; 
additionally, by not taking any action after his escape. During this period, the Mexican 
government received a medium level of international assistance from the United States, but it 
still led to inadequate law enforcement performance against the Sinaloa cartel. Meanwhile, there 
was a turf war between "El Chapo" Guzman and the Carrillo Fuentes and Arellano Felix; the 
Sinaloa state police cooperated with the Sinaloa cartel by providing them with protection against 
the other cartels. For that reason, hypothesis 3 was not sufficiently accurate from 2000-01 with 
an overall medium level of international assistance, causing the government to cooperate with 






high; thus, the Mexican government responded with cooperation when there was high 
international assistance instead of retaliating against the Sinaloa cartel. Henceforth, international 
assistance did not sufficiently explain Colombia's government response as it did for Culiacan. 
Therefore, after looking at each case, my overall assessment of hypothesis 3 is accurate in 
Culiacan but not for Medellin. 
 
Medellin and Culiacan 
 
In this part of the paper, I analyzed Medellin and Culiacan on my independent variables 
to differentiate the outcome of my dependent variables in both cities. Medellin and Culiacan's 
government response can be possibly explained by the type of cartel violence used by the cartel. 
For instance, Colombia's government responded with retaliation when the cartels used direct 
coercive violence against the state. Similarly, Mexico's government responded with cooperation 
when the cartels used coercive violence against civilians or retaliated when coercive violence 
was used against the state. Therefore, hypothesis 2 can be a possible explanation for both 
Medellin and Culiacan's government response. By contrast, hypothesis 3 has a more substantial 
effect on Culiacan than Medellin. Unfortunately, international assistance did not significantly 
impact Medellin, whereas hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 1 influenced how the government 
responded. Nevertheless, hypothesis 2 had a more substantial effect on Culiacan and Medellin 
than hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 3. However, I must acknowledge that there was an interactive 
and cycle relationship among these variables. For instance, in Mexico, when President Calderon 






international assistance increased, which eventually led the Sinaloa cartel to lose monopoly 
control to a competitive control within cartels to more government retaliation. 
Overall, the outcome of these two cities can help explain a possible explanation of why 
governments respond with either cooperation or retaliation depending on the type of cartel 
violence used by cartels and the type of cartel territorial control, or the level of international 
assistance. Initially, I argued that international assistance significantly affected the government's 
response; however, I was incorrect. Medellin and Culiacan can confirm the type of cartel 
violence, and the type of cartel territorial control has the most potent effect on how governments 




In brief, I hope the study conducted above can help contribute to the literature on drug 
cartel violence and state response by providing evidence of interactions among the type of cartel 
violence, the type of cartel territorial control, international assistance with government response 
to cartel violence. I found that the type of cartel violence impacted governments' response more 
than the type of cartel territorial control and international assistance; additionally, how the cycle 
of nature among these variables can explain how they interact with each other. For instance, 
when a new government emerges with repression against a cartel, it leads to more cartel violence 
to more government retaliation to cartels to lose monopoly control. Nevertheless, the case study 
of Medellin and Culiacan can help explore or generate a new theory by looking into the variation 
of different outcomes of government responses. Future research should contribute to the 






Colombian and Mexican governments, to see if there's variation in cooperation or retaliation 
against drug cartels. Additionally, scholars can explore other possible explanations that affect 
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